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James D. Hopkins, An Appreciation
Hon. JOHN P. COHALAN, JR.*
For a period of almost exactly twenty years, from early 1962
until December 31, 1981, James D. (Jim) Hopkins graced the
bench at the appellate division, second department. When he
went to Brooklyn, he was the eighth justice in the department,
having originally been designated by the Governor as a tempo-
rary appointee.1
Not long after his designation, the Judge acquired perma-
nent status, which he maintained until his retirement. At the
time he left the bench, the court had, due to a burgeoning case
load, a total of fifteen justices, of whom eight were of "tempo-
rary" status. It had also acquired the distinction of being the
busiest appellate tribunal in the State of New York, and quite
possibly in the entire nation.
The list of cases in which Judge Hopkins participated and
in the course of which he wrote majority, concurring and dis-
senting opinions, is staggering both in numbers and in scope. To
cull out and discuss a few of the most important is itself a formi-
dable task.
In his two decades of scholarly production on the appellate
bench, he helped to shape the thinking of his colleagues. That
he labored in the semi-obscurity of the appellate division rather
than in the fierce white light of the court of appeals at Albany,
or even in the august chamber of the United States Supreme
Court remains something of a mystery. It might be explained in
part in that he did not thrust himself forward because he was, to
some degree, of a rather reserved nature. He was never one to
blow his own horn.
Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, 1963 to present; former
Justice of the Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department, from 1974 to 1982.
1. The New York State Constitution makes provision for seven permanent justices
in the second department. Upon the request of the court, as many more justices with
temporary status may be appointed as are needed. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4(b),
25(b).
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Part of the reason for this article is to discuss several of the
cases in which he delivered opinions of importance not only to
the immediate litigants, but also to the state at large and to the
members of the judiciary and the bar as well.
I. The Cases
A. A Question of Both Constitutional Law and of Court
Practice
In La Rocca v. Lane,2 the issues included the right of an
attorney employed by the Legal Aid Society to defend a client in
a criminal jury case while wearing a clerical collar. La Rocca was
a Roman Catholic priest who also happened to be a lawyer. He
claimed that he had the right (and that as a duty to his Bishop
he was required) to wear the collar at all times while in public. It
sounded almost like the arguments advanced by the Big Endians
and the Little Endians in Gulliver's Travels, the satire of
Jonathan Swift. There the argument revolved about which end
of an egg should be broken first. Here we have the question of a
collar worn facing to the front or to the rear.
Nevertheless, as Judge Hopkins pointed out, there was a
constitutional question to be decided involving as it did the first
amendment and the separation of church and state. The secon-
dary issue concerned the right of the court, as a matter of proto-
col, to regulate the attire of attorneys appearing before it.
Quite logically and dispassionately the judge, writing for the
court, with one dissent, ruled that:
[W]e conclude that the plaintiff's right to free exercise of religious
belief is subject to reasonable regulation when he appears as an
attorney in court to try a case before a jury. Other considerations
support this view. The petitioner's right to practice as an attorney
is quite different from his right to officiate as a priest. This does
not mean that he gives up his religious beliefs or his priestly du-
ties when he acts as an attorney; it does mean, however, that
when he enters on secular pursuits, he is subject to reasonable
regulations in the secular realm.3
2. 47 A.D.2d 243, 366 N.Y.S.2d 456 (2d Dep't), afl'd, 37 N.Y.2d 575, 338 N.E.2d 606,
376 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976).
3. La Rocca v. Lane, 47 A.D.2d at 248-49, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 461-62.
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On the point having to do with the power of the court to
regulate the attire of an attorney, the Judge observed that:
The court's power to regulate dress cannot be unreasonably exer-
cised. Whether counsel preferred a bow-tie to a four-in-hand, or a
gray suit to a blue, in common experience should have no influ-
ence on the conduct of a trial. There are idiosyncrasies which are
beyond the power of a court or even the strictures of a book of
etiquette to correct. When, nonetheless, a discernible nexus be-
tween dress of an attorney and the attainment of a fair trial be-
comes evident in common experience, the court should take such
action as will be reasonably adapted to regulate the dress of the
attorney.4
The court of appeals, in a six-to-one decision, affirmed the ap-
pellate division.5
B. A Criminal Law Case
A case that attracted widespread attention among the fra-
ternity of criminal lawyers was that of People v. Clayton. It was
of particular interest to the writer of this article in that he acted
as defense counsel, by assignment, in the trial court.
On November 2, 1952 the body of a fifty-two year old black
man was found in a potato house at East Northport in Suffolk
County. The potato crop had already been harvested and who-
ever deposited the body there had every reason to believe that it
would lie undiscovered until the following spring. However, by
happenstance, it was discovered almost immediately and a
search for the perpetrator was begun.
Robert Clayton, a migrant farm worker then twenty-three
years of age and a functional illiterate, was first held as a mate-
rial witness and then, as the presumed culprit, became the tar-
get of the investigation. He was grilled by the police authorities
and the crime was laid at his door. He made a written confesson.
Clayton languished in jail until February 1, 1953, at which
time County Court Judge Munder (who later served with dis-
tinction with both Judge Hopkins and the writer in the appel-
4. Id. at 252, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
5. La Rocca v. Lane, 37 N.Y.2d 575, 338 N.E.2d 606, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93, cert. denied,
424 U.S. 968 (1976).
6. 41 A.D.2d 204, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2d Dep't 1973).
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late division) assigned the writer and James J. Vaughn as de-
fense counsel. The indictment was for murder in the first degree,
which then carried the death penalty.' The confession and other
items of incriminating evidence were used against Clayton at his
trial. The jury returned a verdict of murder in the second de-
gree. He was sentenced by the court to serve thirty years to life.
He did not appeal.
In 1965, twelve years after his incarceration, Clayton
brought a writ of error coram nobis on the ground, inter alia,
that his confession was involuntary. County court denied the re-
lief sought, and the appellate division affirmed, as did the court
of appeals; the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.8
In 1971, eighteen years after his incarceration, Clayton in-
stituted a habeas corpus proceeding in the federal district court.
There it was decided that his confession was not voluntary; the
federal court of appeals affirmed and ordered a retrial within a
specified time. Certiorari was denied in the United States Su-
preme Court.'
On June 30, 1972, after being released on his own recogni-
zance, as a result of the district court's action on his habeas
corpus application, Clayton moved to dismiss the indictment, on
the ground that he had not been timely brought to retrial as
mandated by the United States Court of Appeals. The county
7. Clayton was charged with first degree murder, which at that time was defined in
part as, "[tihe killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is murder in
the first degree, when committed: 1. From a deliberate and premeditated design to effect
the death of the person killed, or of another. . . ." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1044(1) (Dennis
1940), repealed by 1965 N.Y. LAWS c. 1030 (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27
(McKinney 1975)). Former N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045 (Dennis 1940) provided: "[m]urder in
the first degree is punishable by death, unless the jury recommends life imprison-
ment.... " Id., repealed by 1965 N.Y. LAWS c. 1030, § 1 (current version, as amended,
at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06 (McKinney 1975) (death penalty imposed for murder in the
first degree, as defined in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27, applies only to the limited A-I felo-
nies of murder of a police officer killed in the line of duty, an employee of a state correc-
tional facility killed in the course of performing his official duties, or when the defendant
was confined in a state correctional facility upon a life sentence and where the defendant
was over eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.27 (McKinney 1975)).
8. People v. Clayton, 28 A.D.2d 543, 279 N.Y.S.2d 605 (2d Dep't 1967), aff'd, 22
N.Y.2d 841, 239 N.E.2d 734, 293 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 909 (1969).
9. United States ex rel. Clayton v. Mancusi, 326 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D.N.Y. 1971),
aff'd, 454 F.2d 454 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Montayne v. Clayton, 406 U.S. 977
(1972).
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court dismissed the indictment without a hearing and the Dis-
trict Attorney appealed to the appellate division.'0 Judge Hop-
kins, in remanding the matter to the county court, said:
The provisions of CPL 210.40 and 210.45 require a hearing
when either the prosecution or the defendant moves to dismiss
the indictment in the furtherance of justice; and we think that
when the court considers sua sponte a dismissal for the same rea-
son it should not do so until fair notice of its intention has been
given to the parties and a hearing has been held. At the hearing
the parties may, if they are so advised, present such evidence and
arguments as may be pertinent to the interests of justice. Among
the considerations which are applicable to the issue are (a) the
nature of the crime, (b) the available evidence of guilt, (c) the
prior record of the defendant, (d) the punishment already suf-
fered by the defendant, (e) the purpose and effect of further pun-
ishment, (f) any prejudice resulting to the defendant by the pas-
sage of time and (g) the impact on the public interest of a
dismissal of the indictment.
The sensitive balance between the individual and the State
that must be maintained in applying the test of the interests of
justice which CPL 210.40 contemplates moves in response to fac-
tors largely resting on value judgments of the court. But those
judgments in turn hinge on the production of facts in the posses-
sion of the prosecution and the defendant. Moreover, the discre-
tion of the court cannot be properly reviewed unless the record
discloses the facts upon which the court's judgment was based.
On the one side the statute allows an escape from the rigorous
rules controlling the dismissal of an indictment only for reasons
arising from substantial defects in supporting evidence or re-
quired procedure; on the other side, the statute erects the well-
considered discretion of the court as a safeguard to prevent a dis-
missal of the indictment unless the public interests are as fully
protected as the individual interests of the defendant for justice
and mercy.
It may well be that the County Court will again conclude
that the indictment should be dismissed in the furtherance of jus-
tice after giving deliberation to what the parties may offer on the
remand. Certainly, we do not say that the court cannot reach
such a conclusion; and, indeed, the defendant's interest and the
10. The facts presented are drawn from the appellate division decision, People v.
Clayton, 41 A.D.2d at 206, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 108.
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public interests may coincide to compel that conclusion. All that
we now hold is that full opportunity should be afforded to the
People and the defendant to provide the court with such evidence
and arguments that they deem relevant to the issue.1"
Eventually Clayton was freed, and from reports, is now gainfully
employed.
As a personal prerogative, the writer would like to make two
points. There is a footnote in the Hopkins' decision that reads:
"The defendant claims that his assigned counsel, contrary to his
instructions, failed to file a notice of appeal." 2 Being the trial
counsel referred to, I denounce the defendant's statement as a
deliberate falsehood. Over the period of three decades the mem-
ory of what happened in the Riverhead courtroom on the occa-
sion of the return of the jury verdict is fresh in my mind.
When the jury returned its verdict of murder in the second
degree, I was standing on one side of Clayton and Mr. Vaughn
was on the other. The defendant said to me, "Does that mean I
ain't gonna fry," and I responded, "That means you ain't gonna
fry." The District Attorney then walked over to me and said, in
the immediate presence of Clayton, "John, are you going to ap-
peal?", and I said, "I see no reason to." At no time then or
thereafter did Clayton call upon me to file a notice of appeal,
and, of course, People v. Montgomery13 was still sixteen years
into the future. Montgomery stands for the proposition that it is
the duty of the trial lawyer to inform the defeated defendant of
his right to appeal. It was probably the Montgomery case that
jogged Clayton, as a jailhouse lawyer, to raise the question of
11. Id. at 207-08, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 110-11. Even prior to Clayton, a hearing was usu-
ally required when a court dismissed an indictment sua sponte. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW §§ 210.40, 210.45 (McKinney 1982). Justice Hopkins made it clear, however, that it
was necessary to have a specific list of considerations that would be entertained at the
hearing. Consequently, with the addition of these factors, the hearing was transformed
into a "Clayton" hearing. In People v. Belge, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d
867 (1976), the court of appeals expressly invited the legislature to include such a spe-
cific list of criteria in the statute. In 1979 the provision was amended, and the criteria
included by the amendment closely parallel the considerations recommended by Justice
Hopkins (see People v. Clayton, 41 A.D.2d at 207-08, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 110-11), who is
recognized by the Practice Commentary to the Criminal Procedure Law § 210.40 as set-
ting the groundwork for the amendment. See N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 210.40, commen-
tary at 155-58 (McKinney 1982).
12. People v. Clayton, 41 A.D.2d at 205 n.1, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 107 n.1.
13. People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130, 247 N.E.2d 130, 299 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1969).
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appeal. Further, by the very statement of the District Attorney,
Clayton was apprised of his right to appeal.
One might gather from reading the various decisions that
were handed down in the Clayton matter that he was an inno-
cent man, grievously wronged as a result of the People's action.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Weep not for Robert
Clayton. He committed a cold blooded murder with an axe to
steal money from his victim for the benefit of himself and his
paramour. There was no justification whatever for the crime.
C. A Declaratory Judgment Action Involving a Question of
Jurisdiction
In Carr v. Carr,14 our Judge wrote for a unanimous court in
a declaratory judgment action. Special term had granted the mo-
tion of the California defendant, Barbara Carr (the second wife
of Paul Carr, who died a resident of California on December 17,
1975) to dismiss the complaint of Ann E. Carr, the first wife, for
lack of in rem jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction of
the defendant.
Ann Carr married Paul on November 16, 1956 in Nevada,
and lived with him in various countries during his employment
in the United States Foreign Service. Because of his allegedly
cruel treatment, she left him in 1965 and established her domi-
cile in New York City. In February of 1967, Paul Carr obtained
an ex parte Honduran divorce on the ground of abandonment.1 5
Based on the argument that the marital res followed the
domicile of the plaintiff, Ann Carr, and that if Carr were still
living at the time, she could have commenced her suit in New
York State for a declaration that she was still his wife, the order
dismissing the complaint was reversed and the defendant's mo-
tion was denied. 16 Although the court of appeals reversed the
appellate division, Chief Judge Breitel and Judge Wachtler took
occasion to remark that:
We dissent and vote to affirm on the opinion of Mr. Justice James
14. Carr v. Carr, 60 A.D.2d 63, 400 N.Y.S.2d 105 (2d Dep't 1977), rev'd, 46 N.Y.2d
270, 385 N.E.2d 1234, 413 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1978).
15. The facts presented are drawn from the appellate division decision. Carr v. Carr,
60 A.D.2d at 65-66, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
16. Id. at 69, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
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D. Hopkins at the Appellate Division in which the concededly dif-
ficult problem in this case is elaborated with a keen sense for the
legal and policy reasons for the result. We endorse the analysis
and it would be supererogation to substitute an elaboration for
that of Mr. Justice Hopkins. 17
D. The Right to an Administrative Hearing
In Economico v. Village of Pelham,18 plaintiff, a police of-
ficer, became disabled on January 27, 1976 as the result of a
nonservice-connected automobile accident. He went on sick
leave, with pay. On October 25, 1976 he was ordered by the
Chief of Police to report for work. He refused, on the ground
that he was still physically unfit for duty. For eighteen months
he continued to collect his salary, while the village sought in
vain to remove him to make way for an able-bodied person in
his place. The battle raged about Economico's right to a pre-
termination hearing. When he was ultimately removed without a
hearing, he commenced an Article 78 proceeding for reinstate-
ment, claiming a denial of due process and the violation of the
bargaining agreement which entitled him to unlimited sick leave.
The appellate division, by a three-to-one vote, confirmed his
dismissal.19 In dissent, Judge Hopkins wrote:
Once having been appointed to his position and obtaining tenure
(Civil Service Law, §§ 58, 63), the petitioner held a property in-
terest. That property interest was the right of an individual to
enjoy a privilege recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.
Section 73 of the Civil Service Law, permitting the termina-
tion of employment status after a continuous absence from duty
for a year or more arising from disability, makes no provision for
a hearing and the petitioner was not given a hearing before he
was separated from his employment. We must read into the pro-
visions of the statute the requirement of a hearing in order to
save it from a declaration of unconstitutionality, if the Statute is
17. 46 N.Y.2d 270, 274, 385 N.E.2d 1234, 1237, 413 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (1978) (Brei-
tel, C.J. and Wachtler, J., dissenting).
18. Economico v. Village of Pelham, 67 A.D. 272, 415 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2d Dep't 1977),
aff'd, 50 N.Y.2d 120, 405 N.E.2d, 694, 428 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1980).
19. Economico v. Village of Pelham, 67 A.D.2d at 280, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
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otherwise constitutional.
In my view the statute is not unconstitutional when the re-
quirement of a hearing is impliedly read into its provision. A mu-
nicipality should not be forced to retain indefinitely in its em-
ployment one who cannot discharge his duties, and it may well
become difficult, if not impossible, to find a qualified substitute to
fill the void in the roster. At the same time, however, neither
should the disabled employee be deprived of his position without
the opportunity of being heard.20
Justice Hopkins further stated:
The private interest of the petitioner is substantial. Outside
of the liberty of the individual and the provisions and security of
his home and shelter, I can think of no interest greater than the
right to pursue and enjoy a livelihood. The subsistence of the in-
dividual depends largely on the fruits of his labor, and the depri-
vation of his livelihood strikes at the roots of his dignity and
integrity.
The risk of an erroneous decision is less under the circum-
stances than in the instance of charges leading to disciplinary
measures under section 75 of the Civil Service Law. The need to
establish the factual foundation for action under section 73 of the
Civil Service Law is much less stringent - the absence for the re-
quired period due to disability is the factual pattern contem-
plated by the statute. Thus, an evidentiary hearing would not be
necessary. That does not mean that an opportunity for a simple
hearing should not be afforded. Even though the municipal board
or officer may have the power to terminate the employee's status,
the employee may be able to persuade them that such action
should not be taken, or should be deferred.2
He concluded that:
Hence, the provisions for a simple hearing before action is
taken under section 73 of the Civil Service Law should be read
into the statute in order to preserve its constitutionality.
We cannot now speculate what a hearing may produce to
benefit the petitioner; it is enough that the petitioner must be
accorded his day before the village is empowered to act. The
20. Id. at 280-81, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 245-46 (Hopkins, J., dissenting) (citations and
footnote omitted).
21. Id. at 282, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (Hopkins, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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judgment should therefore be affirmed.2 '
Unfortunately, Judge Hopkins' arguments were unavailing. The
court of appeals affirmed.23
E. Negligence - Proximate Cause - Foreseeability
In Pagan v. Goldberger,24 a three-year old child, living with
his parents and several siblings in a leased apartment owned by
the defendant, fell against a sharp metal top of a radiator from
which the adjustor or knob had been removed. The landlord had
been given actual notice some five months before the accident
but the condition was not remedied. Trial term dismissed the
complaint at the end of plaintiff's case on the grounds of lack of
proximate cause and lack of foreseeability. In reversing and
granting a new trial Judge Hopkins, speaking for the court,
noted that:
Negligence as a legal concept traditionally includes both
proximate cause and foreseeability as tests of liability. The com-
mon law recognizes fault as the primary ground of responsibility
to another for injury; and proximate cause and foreseeability re-
present attempts to measure fault. In most cases the focus is di-
rected on the kind of conduct which is claimed to have been inju-
rious, and the jury is called upon to determine, upon varying
evidence, what the nature of the conduct really was, and whether
the injury really was sustained as a result of the conduct.2 5
Taking a step by step analysis, he observed that:
The decisions in other cases serve only as examples of the
process whereby the concept of proximate cause is applied. The
doctrinal sweep is so broad that a flexibility of approach, almost
intuitive in nature, must be used. Some helpful guidelines
emerge, not as overarching principles, but simply as tools of
analysis:
1). The test of status-is there an existing legal relationship
between the parties? In this case, the relationship of landlord-
tenant, with the concomitant statutory overlay (see Multiple
22. Id. at 283, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 247 (Hopkins, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
23. Economico v. Village of Pelham, 50 N.Y.2d 120, 405 N.E.2d 694, 428 N.Y.S.2d
213 (1980).
24. Pagan v. Goldberger, 51 A.D.2d 508, 382 N.Y.S.2d 549 (2d Dep't 1976).
25. Id. at 509, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
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Dwelling Law § 78) is present.
2). The test of temporal duration - is the occurrence of the
injury tied to the claimed negligent act or omission within a rea-
sonable lapse of time? In this case, the asserted negligent condi-
tion had endured an appreciable length of time, and it could be
found that the injury occurred immediately upon contact with the
condition.
3). The test of spatial relation - is the occurrence of the in-
jury close or far in distance from the point of the claimed negli-
gent act or omission? In this case, the injured infant plaintiff was
found touching the asserted negligent condition.
4). The test of foreseeability - is the claimed negligent act or
omission reasonably predictable as a cause of the occurrence of
the injury? In this case, the defendant was apprised of the pres-
ence of a small child in the household and had notice of the as-
serted negligent condition.
5). The test of public policy - is there an identifiable policy
which either protects the victim of the injury or forbids liability
for the injury? In this case, the interests or public policy are em-
bodied in the statutory command that a landlord of a multiple
dwelling should maintain the premises in good repair (Multiple
Dwelling Law § 78).2"
F. Discussion of Liens - Public and Private
In Paerdegat Boat and Racquet Club, Inc. v. Zarrelli,2 7 spe-
cial term had discharged the public improvement lien, and on
the theory that a mechanic's lien may not attach to city-owned
property or to the improvements erected thereon, also dis-
charged the mechanic's lien. All five appellate judges agreed that
the public improvement lien should be discharged. The contro-
versy revolved around the question posed by the majority: "can
[real] property owned by a municipal corporation and leased to
a private entity for private purposes validly be encumbered by a
mechanic's lien to the extent of the leasehold interest? '2 8
In a three-to-two decision, Judges Hopkins and Rabin dis-
sented, answering the question in the affirmative. Taking up the
cudgel for the dissenters, Hopkins said:
26. Id. at 511-12, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
27. Paerdegat Boat & Racquet club, Inc. v. Zarrelli, 83 A.D.2d 444, 445 N.Y.S.2d 162
(2d Dep't 1981), rev'd, 57 N.Y.2d 966, 443 N.E.2d 477, 457 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1982).
28. Id. at 446, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
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The statute differentiates between private liens and public liens
(e.g., compare Lien Law, § 3 with Lien Law, § 5), and the ques-
tion before us is whether it sanctions the filing of a private lien
against the interest of Paerdegat under a lease of property owned
by the City of New York. We would expect that in such an impor-
tant matter the statute would be clear and explicit in authorizing
such filing. It is not, and the statutory language, properly con-
strued, leads to the contrary conclusion.
Turning to the statutory definitions-which are the founda-
tion of the rights created by liens-we find that " 'real property,'
when used in this chapter, includes real estate, lands, tenements
and hereditaments, corporeal and incorporeal . . . and the right
of franchise granted by a public corporation for the use of the
streets or public places thereof, and all structures placed thereon
for the use of such right or franchise" (Lien Law, § 2, subd. 2). A
"'public corporation,' when used in this chapter, means a munici-
pal corporation" (Lien Law, § 2, subd. 6). The definition of real
property does not include any such property of a public corpora-
tion, except a franchise granted by it. Hence, the definition nega-
tives any scope for a private lien against a lease of municipal
property. Even more tellingly, the statute does not expressly or
implicitly distinguish between lease of municipal property used
for public purposes and lease of municipal property used for non-
public purposes.
The reasons for the substitution of the funds of the munici-
pal corporation in place of its real property were early delineated.
It was recognized that public property, if subject to lien and the
threat of foreclosure, would be intolerably burdened and
harassed, that public property was traditionally immune from ex-
ecution and seizure, and that the comfort and safety of the public
might be interrupted or destroyed. These grounds of public policy
have been consistently observed by later cases.
As I understand the position of the majority, the force of
these precedents is acknowledged, but a further gloss is intro-
duced in the rule by making its application depend on whether
the use of the property is devoted to public purpose. I do not
perceive in the cases any distinction related to that test; indeed,
the latest precedent in our court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals rejects the basis for such a distinction.
[Vol. 3:479
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I therefore vote to affirm the order.2"
The cases noted above serve to illustrate what Justice Car-
dozo, in his learned treatise Law and Literature, wrote on the
subject of opinions:
Classification must be provisional, for forms run into one another.
As I search the archives of my memory, I seem to discern six
types or methods which divide themselves from one another with
measurable distinctness. There is the type magisterial or impera-
tive; the type laconic or sententious; the type conversational or
homely; the type refined or artificial, smelling of the lamp, verg-
ing at times upon preciosity or euphuism; the type demonstrative
or persuasive; and finally the type tonsorial or agglutinative, so
called from the shears and the pastepot which are its implements
and emblem.30
Were it not for the circumstance that he was on an intermediate
rather than the highest court, I would unhesitatingly suggest
that Judge Hopkins' writings could qualify as magisterial or im-
perative. Cardozo said of such writing:
It eschews ornament. It is meager in illustration and analogy. If it
argues, it does so with the downward rush and overwhelming con-
viction of the syllogism, seldom with tentative gropings towards
the inductive apprehension of a truth imperfectly discerned. We
hear the voice of the law speaking by its consecrated ministers
with the calmness and assurance that are born of a sense of mas-
tery and power.8 1
Faced as we are with the intermediate status of the appellate
division, however, we must place Judge Hopkins into the type
characterized as demonstrative or persuasive. For certainly in
the exchange of opinion and argument with us, his fellows, he
convinced many an undecided colleague to go his way, and his
opinions follow syllogistic and analytical lines.
II. The Judge as a Person
While on the bench, Jim Hopkins was held in high admira-
tion and esteem by his colleagues. Never one to push himself
29. Id. at 449-52, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 166-68 (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
30. B. CARDozo, LAW AND LITERATURE 9-10 (1931).
31. Id. at 10.
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forward, he was at all times ready and willing to help anyone in
any problem presented, and would go out of his way to be of
assistance. It was a delight to watch him preside at the court
sittings. Except in the few instances when he might be sitting on
a panel with the presiding justice, he was, by virtue of his senior
status, the justice presiding whenever he sat. He seldom made
positive statements to the attorneys appearing before the court.
Rather, he would pose sticky questions, using what may be
termed the Socratic method. His approach served to put the at-
torneys on their mettle in trying to respond to his queries.
Well might it be asked, upon what meat does this our col-
league feed that he is grown so great? Every step in his career
appeared to point towards the ultimate goals of high achieve-
ment, the respect and esteem of his fellows, and a permanent
position in the legal history of our state.
Born in March 1911 in Westchester County, he graduated
from Columbia College in 1931 at the age of twenty, from the
law school in 1933, and was admitted to the bar in 1934. He
entered private practice upon admission and at the same time
applied himself to public and governmental endeavors. In fairly
rapid succession, he was a Town Councilman in North Castle,
from 1939 to 1943, then its Supervisor for five two-year terms
from 1944 to 1953, and Chairman of the Board of Supervisors in
his final term. Thereafter he served as Westchester County Ex-
ecutive for four years. Switching from the legislative and execu-
tive branches of government, he ran for and was elected County
Judge in the fall of 1957. He is the only person to have served in
all three branches of Westchester County government.
His term as County Judge was curtailed when in 1960 Gov-
ernor Rockefeller appointed Jim Hopkins to the supreme court
bench for the ninth judicial district, which embraces the coun-
ties of Westchester, Dutchess, Putnam, Rockland, and Orange.
That same year, Jim was elected to a fourteen year term. He had
scarcely settled himself comfortably on the supreme court bench
when he was again elevated by Governor Rockefeller, this time
to the appellate division, where he served until his recent retire-
ment, as above noted.
In his multifarious activities, he has out-beavered the bea-
ver, serving as he has on faculties of judicial seminars, as the
author of many and varied law review articles, and in traveling
[Vol. 3:479
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nationwide to attend and to speak at judicial functions.
The record of his opinions that were reviewed favorably by
the court of appeals verges on the incredible. One might well
imagine that the high court kept a series of rubber stamps vari-
ously inscribed: "affirmed" or "reversed" or "modified" "on the
opinion/dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice James D. Hopkins at
the appellate division." Three recent court of appeals decisions
were so labeled.
In Marcus v. Baron, the remittitur read "[o]rder reversed
• ..and judgment of Supreme Court, Rockland County, rein-
stated for reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of former Jus-
tice James D. Hopkins at the Appellate Division."3 Paerdegat
Boat and Racquet Club, Inc. v. Zarrelli came down with the no-
tation: "[o]rder reversed. . . and the mechanic's lien discharged
for reasons stated in the concurring in part and dissenting in
part opinion by former Justice James D. Hopkins at the Appel-
late Division. ' s Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Jamaica
Water Supply Co. read "[o]rder affirmed. . . for reasons stated
in the opinion by former Justice James D. Hopkins at the Ap-
pellate Division."3 4
Most recently, he collaborated with Robert MacCrate, for-
mer counsel to Governor Rockefeller and immediate past presi-
dent of the American Judicature Society, and Professor Maurice
Rosenberg of Columbia University Law School to study appel-
late justice at the request of the court of appeals. The result is a
195-page treatise entitled Appellate Justice in New York,
which, in all likelihood,3 5 will effect some important changes in
procedures and in substance in the state courts.
His writings are models of keenness of discernment, lucidity
of expression and, where called for, are terse and concise. Unlike
32. Marcus v. Baron, 57 N.Y.2d 862, 864-65, 442 N.E.2d 437, 437, 456 N.Y.S.2d 39,
39 (1982), rev'g 84 A.D.2d 118, 445 N.Y.S.2d 587 (2d Dep't 1981).
33. Paerdegat Boat & Racquet Club, Inc. v. Zarrelli, 57 N.Y.2d 966, 968, 443 N.E.2d
477, 478, 457 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (1982), rev'g 83 A.D.2d 444, 445 N.Y.S.2d 162 (2d Dep't
1981). For a discussion of this case at the appellate division level, see supra text accom-
panying notes 27-29.
34. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jamaica Water Supply Co., 57 N.Y.2d 994, 996, 443
N.E.2d 493, 493, 457 N.Y.S.2d 245, 245 (1982), aff'g 83 A.D.2d 427, 444 N.Y.S.2d 925 (2d
Dep't 1981).
35. R. MACCRATE, J. HOPKINS & M. ROSENBERG, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN NEw YORK
(1982).
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some appellate effusions which are paradigms of tortuous an-
fractuosities, his are readable and understandable at first try.
One might use a quatrain by James Russell Lowell to illustrate
this thought:
His words were simple words enough,
And yet he used them so,
That what in other mouths was rough,
In his seemed musical and low. 6
As a final remark, and a personal one, I conclude by saying,
Jim, it has been a privilege to know you and to have served with
you in Brooklyn. May you and your lovely and loving wife, Bert,
enjoy a happy and well deserved retirement. Ad multos annos,
good luck and God Bless.
36. The quatrain is from The Shepard of King Admetus, by James Russell Lowell.
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